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RECENT DECISIONS

Recent Decision:
Loyalty Oath Held
Unconstitutionally Vague
Members of the faculty and staff of the
University of Washington brought an action in a federal district court to have declared unconstitutional several Washington
statutes1 requiring the taking of an oath
by state employees as a condition of their
continued employment.' Each employee
was required to affirm that he was not, nor
had he ever been, a "subversive person,"
defined as one who
.. . commits, attempts to commit, or aids
in the commission, or advocates, abets, advises or teaches by any means any person
to commit, attempt to commit, or aid in
the commission of any act intended to overthrow . . . the government of the United
States or the State of Washington . . . by
revolution, force or violence; or who with
knowledge ... becomes or remains a member of a subversive organization.
Under this statute the Communist Party
was designated as a subversive organization.
The Supreme Court of the United States,
in reversing the decision of the district
court, held that this statute violated the
due process clause because the text of the
statute was unconstitutionally vague. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
The device most frequently utilized by
state and local governments for the purpose of securing their institutions against

1

WASH. REV.

CODE §§

9.81.010(2),

9.81.060,

9.81.070, 9.81.083 (1955).
2 There was a second oath involved in Baggett v.
Bullitt but it will not be treated here. The
greater part of the Court's opinion regarding
this oath involved a discussion of the applicability of the abstention doctrine, which is beyond
the scope of this article.
3WASH.

REV. CODE § 9.81.010(5)

(1951).

disloyal employees has been the loyalty
oath. 4 The first cases testing the constitutional validity of loyalty oaths were decided by the Supreme Court in the early
fifties at a time when cold war tensions
were high and congressional investigation
of subversive activity was at its peak.5
During this period there was constant demand for loyalty oaths and other similar
devices, 6 especially in the field of education.' States, in particular, felt the need
for a better system of insulating this sensitive area against the forces of subversion.
However, with the passage of time the
American people have become acclimated
to the pressures of the cold war. Many of
the fears so prevalent in the early fifties
have since diminished; as a consequence,
one notices a marked decline in the popularity of many forms of internal security
legislation. When analyzing the decisions
of the Supreme Court in connection with
this phenomenon, we perceive a definite
parallelism.
In the initial loyalty oath cases, the constitutional validity of the statutes involved
was upheld and the argument of unconstitutional vagueness was rejected. 8 In

4 See

BROWN,

LOYALTY

AND

SECURITY

164-82

(1958); Morris, Academic Freedom And Loyalty
Oaths, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 496 (1963).
For a thorough and enlightening treatment of
the origin of loyalty programs see Emerson &
Helfeld, Loyalty Among Federal Employees, 58
YALE L.J. 1 (1948).
5 Rackow, The FederalLoyalty Program:Politics
and Civil Liberty, 12 W. RES. L. REV. 701

(1961).
6 Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 183, 76 A.2d
332, 338 (1950).
Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493

(1952).
A statute suffers from the defect of unconstitutional vagueness if it "either forbids or requires

8

10
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Gerende v. Board of Supervisors,' the
Court was confronted with a Maryland
statute phrased in language identical to
that of the statute in the instant case.
Under the Maryland act, any person seeking to have his name placed on a ballot
was required to swear that he was not a
"subversive person," i.e., one who

five years, do not now, and will not, while
in the service of the city, "advise, advocate, or teach the overthrow, by force,
violence or other unlawful means, of the
State of California or the United States
or belong to any organization which does

•..commits, attempts to commit, or aids
in the commission, or advocates, abets, advises or teaches by any means any person
to commit, attempt to commit, or aid in
the commission of any act intended to

clared a federal statute constitutional and
rejected the challenge of unconstitutional
vagueness. In this case petitioners, leaders
of the American Communist Party, were
convicted under Sections 2 and 3 of the

overthrow, destroy or alter . . . the con-

stitutional form of government of the
United States or of the State of Maryland

'1
So. "5

Similarly, in the landmark case of
Dennis v. United States,16 the Court de-

Smith Act 17 for conspiring to overthrow

Although the opinion was stated with a

the government by "force or violence."
They argued that the wording of section
2 was unconstitutionally vague, i.e., that

qualification,11 the Court, in affirming the

it did not "sufficiently . . . [advise] those

judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals, upheld the act's validity and rejected
the argument of unconstitutional vague-

who would speak of the limitations upon

• . . by revolution, force or violence.1-

ness.1

2

In Garner v. Board of Pub. Works,' 3 the
Court upheld the validity of a Los Angeles
ordinance over a plea of unconstitutional
vagueness.1 4 The statute required all city
employees to subscribe to an oath stating
that they have not, within the previous

the doing of an act in terms so vague that men

of common intelligence must necessarily guess at

its meaning and differ as to its application.... "
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385,
391 (1926).
9 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
10 M. ANN. CODE art. 85A, § 1 (1949).
11 In Gerende the Supreme Court accepted, as
fulfilling the statutory requirement, a limited
version of the actual oath prescribed.
12Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 361, 382 n.*
(1964) (dissenting opinion of Clark, J.).
13 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
14 Accord, Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485
(1952).

their activity." '

In his majority opinion in Dennis, Mr.
Chief Justice Vinson dismissed petitioner's
complaint and took a realistic approach.
He stated that "like all verbalizations,"
this statute was "subject to criticism on
the score of indefiniteness," but he thought
that it well served
to indicate to those who would advocate
constitutionally prohibited conduct that
there is a line beyond which they, in full
knowledge of what they intended and the
circumstances in which their activity takes
place, will appreciate and understand.19
Subsequent to its previous approach
of upholding the constitutionality of loyalty
oaths, the Court embarked upon the policy

15 Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance 94,004 (1948).
16 341 U.S.494 (1951).
17 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1948).

1S Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 515
(1951).
19Id. at 516.
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of limiting their constitutional scope commencing with its decision in Wieman v.
Updegraff.20 This case involved an Oklahoma statute2 requiring an employee to
swear that he had never been a member of
a subversive organization. This statute was
declared unconstitutionally vague.2 1' The
Court found that the oath lacked the element of scienter, i.e., it did not differentiate between "innocent" and "knowing"
membership. In deciding this case the
Court distinguished Gerende, Garner and
Adler on the ground that the element
of scienter was implicitly contained within
the statutes there in question .2.
The scope of loyalty oaths was further
diminished in the 1960 case of Shelton v.
Tucker.24 There an Arkansas statute required teachers, as a condition of their
employment, to file annually an affidavit
listing every organization to which they
had belonged or contributed within the
preceding five years. 2 In setting aside
the statute as vague and, therefore, violative of due process, the Court stated that
its "unlimited and indiscriminate sweep
.. .goes far beyond what might be justified
in the exercise of the State's legitimate in2
quiry into the fitness . . . of its teachers. 6
Besides requiring scienter, it is now apparent that any loyalty oath must also be
limited in its scope to a reasonable number
of clearly designated organizations.
20 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
"1 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51,

§§ 37.1-.8 (Supp.

1952).
22
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
23 Id. at 191. See Nostrand v. Little, 362 U.S. 474

(1962), where the Court declared that in accordance with due process the employee must have a
hearing to determine if the requisite element of
scienter is present.

' 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
25 ARK. STAT. ANN. §
21;Shelton v. Tucker,

80-1229 (1958).
364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960).

A third restriction was added to the constitutional purview of loyalty oaths in the
1961 case of Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction.2 7 Cramp involved a Florida statute which required each state employee to
swear in writing that he had never lent his
"aid, support, advice, counsel or influence
to the Communist Party. ''2s The Court
found these words lacking in "terms susceptible of objective measurement" and declared the oath unconstitutionally vague.
We are not told what would constitute
"terms susceptible of objective measurement," but the Court did point out that
the statutory language said nothing about
"advocacy of the violent overthrow of the
government" or membership in, or affilia29
tion with, the Communist Party.
In the principal case the Court has once
again found the wording of a loyalty oath
unconstitutionally vague. In reaching this
conclusion, the majority relied on an analysis of the statutory language and its decision in Cramp. Mr. Justice White, writing
for the majority, stated that a person who
swore to the oath would be justified in
supposing that any advice or aid in the
form of instruction that he would give,
however innocently, to a member of the
Communist Party, would make him a "subversive person" within the meaning of the
statute. The rationale behind this was that
at some future date his teaching might
30
conceivably aid the activities of the Party.
Continuing, he stated that "one cannot
confidently assert that his counsel, aid,
influence or support which adds to the
resources, rights and knowledge of the
27
28

29

368 U.S. 278 (1961).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 876.05 (1959).
Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S.

278, 286 (1961).
30 Baggett v. Bullitt, supra note 12, at 368.

10
Communist Party or its members does not
aid the Party . . . in furtherance of the
stated purpose of overthrowing the government. '31 Citing the decision in Cramp,
Mr. Justice White concluded that the oath
in the instant case suffered from the same
infirmities. Here, as in Cramp, "the susceptibility of the statutory language to require forswearing of an undefended variety
of 'guiltless knowing behavior' " makes the
32
oath unconstitutionally vague.
The respondents, however, argued that
the cases of Gerende v. Board of Supervisors and Dennis v. United States should
control. They contended (1) that the definition of "subversive person" contained in
the statute involved in Gerende was identical to the definition in the Washington
act, and (2) that Sections 2 and 3 of the
Smith Act, which were passed upon in
Dennis, proscribed the same activity in the
same language as did the Washington statute.
Dismissing the respondents' arguments,
the majority stated that in Gerende the
Court did not pass upon or approve the
definition of "subversive person," but affirmed solely on the basis of the oath actually imposed.3 3 Regarding Dennis, the
Court stated that the respondents' contention was based upon a misreading of Section 2 of the Smith Act and also that the
Court in Yates v. United States34 had
clearly defined what the sections "do and
do not proscribe." 3 5
Consequently, the above analysis of the
instant case in light of the decisions previously discussed makes it difficult for one
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to concur with the opinion of the majority.
In the instant case the Court has struck
down a statute much narrower in scope
than those previously considered. A reading of the Washington statute discloses the
presence of the element of scienter as required by Wieman.3 6 The statute is also in
conformity with the ruling in Shelton, in
that it proscribes membership in subversive organizations and specifically names
the Communist Party.37 Furthermore, it is
difficult to see how the Washington oath
suffers from the same infirmities of vagueness as the oath in Cramp, since it contains
the very elements found lacking in Cramp,
namely, advocacy of the violent overthrow
of the Government and membership in the
Communist Party. 38
Likewise, it is hard to understand how
the Court found the language of the Washington act so profoundly vague when they
had no such difficulty with the identical
language of the statute construed in Gerende.3 9 In Dennis the Court upheld Sections 2 and 3 of the Smith Act against a
charge of vagueness. In the instant case,
however, the Court struck down language
much clearer than that used in sections 2
and 3. "Where does this leave the con' 40
stitutionality of the Smith Act?
The decision in Baggett v. Bullitt casts
serious doubt upon the future of loyalty
oaths in our society. This decision notwithstanding, if a state enacts a loyalty oath
which is not susceptible to an attack of
unconstitutional vagueness, will this fact
alone be enough to sustain its existence?
36

31 Ibid.

37

WASH. REV. CODE § 9.81.010(5) (1953).
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.81.010, 9.81.083 (1953).

32 Ibid.
3 ld. at 368 n.7.

38

Ibid.

34 354 U.S. 298 (1957).

31Baggett v. Bullitt, supra note 12, at 370 n.8.

39MD. ANN. CODE art. 85A, § 1 (1949).
40 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 361, 384 (1964)
(dissenting opinion of Clark, J.).
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It has been and remains the concerted
opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr.
Justice Black that loyalty oaths and similar
devices violate the first amendment guarantee of "free dissemination of ideas.

' 41

Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in Speiser
v. Randall,42 stated that with the adoption

of the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth
amendment
a rather broad range of liberties was newly
guaranteed to the citizen against state
action. Included were those contained in
the First Amendment-the right to speak
freely, the right to believe what one
43
chooses, the right of conscience.

Apart from the constitutional question,
these Justices also consider such devices
as opposed to our founding principles:
they retard intellectual advancement, make
second-class citizens out of those who
must subscribe, and cast a pall of suspicion
over the classroom. Mr. Justice Black, also
concurring in Speiser,""stated that
loyalty oaths as well as other contemporary "security measures," tend to stifle all
forms of unorthodox or unpopular thinking or expression-the kind of thought and
expression which has played such a vital
and beneficial role in the history of this Nation.

45

41 See Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 508
(1952) (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.); cf.,
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 555 (1952)
(dissenting opinion of Black, J.); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 579 (1951) (dissenting opinion of Black, J.).
42 357 U.S. 513, 532 (1958) (concurring opinion
of Douglas, J).
43

Id. at 535.

44 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958).
45 Id. at 532.

Because of the urgings of these Justices
and the Court's interest in the area of civil
liberties, it appears reasonable to predict
that if the loyalty oath is ever again placed
in issue it will be declared unconstitutional
on first amendment grounds.
The result of such a decision would
surely mean the total elimination of all
loyalty oaths. Some in our society are certain to view such an event as opening the
floodgates of subversion. However, following an examination of the workability of
loyalty oaths it appears that such a result
is quite unlikely. The loyalty oath fails in
principle before it is ever put into practice.
No one can dispute the fact that a communist will swear to any oath if it will
help him achieve his purpose. The device
is, therefore, totally ineffectual against
those at whom it is directed. The person
who actually feels the impact of such legislation is the conscientious objector who refuses, because of his principles, to take
the oath. 46 As a result, persons of unquestionable loyalty and competency are eliminated from public service, something
47
which no society can afford.
Whether there will continue to be a
place in our society for loyalty oaths depends, in great measure, upon the Supreme
Court's attitude in future cases; if it continues its present tendency to regard first
amendment freedoms as "absolute," then
the loyalty oath cannot long endure.
95 (1958).
example, because of a California oath
twenty-six members of the University of California were dismissed; thirty-seven resigned in
protest. The sad fact is that there was absolutely
no evidence that any of these men were communists. Ibid.
46 BROWN, LOYALTY AND SECURITY

47 For

